Assessing goodness-of-fit measures for multidimensional personal epistemiology survey instruments: An alternate approach using multitrait-multimethod confirmatory factor analysis by Harbaugh, A.G.
Paper Code: 00486 
 
AARE 2011 Conference Proceedings  1 
 
Assessing Goodness-of-Fit Measures for 
Multidimensional Personal Epistemology Survey Instruments: 
An Alternate Approach Using Multitrait-Multimethod Confirmatory Factor Analysis 




Survey instruments measuring multidimensional attributes of individualsʼ personal epistemology 
beliefs have not demonstrated strong goodness-of-fit between the hypothesized model and 
collected data. Despite this, the growing body of research in personal epistemology suggests the 
existence of multiple dimensions of epistemic beliefs. To date, previous surveys have been 
examined using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in which the dimensions of beliefs have been 
the levels of a single factor examined. The dimensional structure explored in this study includes 
certainty, structure, authority, innate ability and acquisition speed. Alternatively, the multitrait-
multimethod (MTMM) CFA introduces a second factor into the model. In this context, the second 
factor was a “method” effect introduced by the philosophical classification of the questions/items in 
the survey.  This project demonstrated that the MTMM CFA is the better statistical tool to confirm 
the presence of five distinct dimensions in a traditional epistemic belief survey. This was 
accomplished by modelling the influence of the epistemic belief dimensions crossed with the 
philosophical nature of the items in the survey. Data were collected over two academic terms in 
various levels of mathematics courses in a community college in the Pacific Northwest region of the 
USA. Items in the survey were selected to measure the five epistemic dimensions listed above. 
Items were then classified as axiomatic, ontologic, deontologic or procedural in nature 
(deontological items were excluded). Results statistically indicated that the MTMM CFA model was 
the strongest model compared to standard (single factor) CFA models or alternate 
conceptualizations of the (dual factor) MTMM CFA model. In addition, results indicate very strong 
goodness-of-fit measures for the MTMM CFA model (CFI = 0.94; RMSEA = 0.038). Epistemic 
belief profiles for students are various levels of mathematics instruction in the tertiary environment 
were also explored. 
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Introduction 
       Beliefs about knowledge can influence how students choose to engage in learning.  This has 
been demonstrated in mathematics classrooms (Lampert, 1990; Schoenfeld, 1988).  Here are a 
few examples that demonstrate how beliefs about knowledge and learning have the potential to 
influence student engagement.  (a) A belief that mathematics is composed of simple facts may 
result in a student memorizing formulas and rules instead of looking for underlying patterns 
connecting those very formulas and rules.  (b) A belief that all mathematics problems can be 
answered quickly may result in a student abandoning effort on a problem after a few moments of 
thought and struggle.  (c) A belief that speed is necessary to demonstrate aptitude in mathematics 
may cause the slower—but thoughtful—student to lose interest in mathematics under the mistaken 
assumption that they have no innate talent in mathematics. 
       Most researchers would acknowledge that it is necessary to understand these possible 
relationships if we are to support our students as they learn mathematics (and other disciplines).  
As such, it would be necessary to measure (at least) the five aspects of beliefs about knowledge 
and learning suggested above.  Yet, this is the nature of the current problem:  measurement of 
these beliefs about knowledge and learning has been problematic.  Current statistical methods 
suggest that there are possible psychometric flaws with the surveys used to measure studentsʼ 
beliefs about knowledge and learning.  This paper examines the effectiveness of an alternate 
statistical tool to extract psychometric information from the survey instruments in current use. 
 
Personal Epistemology 
       The study of knowledge, epistemology, is the field of philosophy in which researchers explore 
the nature of knowledge, truth and the process of justification.  For example, one proposed 
definition of knowledge is a true and justified belief (BonJour, 2002).  In this realm, knowledge is 
generally understood to relate to a cognitive process, but it is explored as a concept that may (or 
may not) be separate from the knowing agent.  However, as individuals are involved in the 
construction of their beliefs, it is also possible to explore the process of knowing in the 
psychological realm.  The study of the beliefs that a person holds about knowledge, knowing, 
learning and the process of justification have come to be termed as personal epistemology (Pintrich 
& Hofer, 1997). 
       The origins of personal epistemology began with Perryʼs (1970/1998) work with Harvard 
undergraduates.  Other researchers proposed additional models for the development of beliefs 
about knowledge and the process of justification (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986; 
Baxter Magolda, 1992; King & Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn, 1991).  Common features among all of these 
proposed models included the existence of stages of development and the generally linear 
progression through the stages.  In their extensive review, Hofer and Pintrich (1997) suggested 
similarities in the stages of these models.  One time-consuming aspect of these research protocols 
was the interview process used to assess a personʼs epistemic beliefs1.  As research in the field 
progressed, surveys were used to obtain data from people in a more efficient manner (Moore, 
1989; Schommer, 1990). 
       One of the earliest surveys to explore epistemic beliefs was Schommerʼs (1990) 
Epistemological Questionnaire.  This was a 63-item survey.  The innovative element of this new 
tool was that it conceptualized epistemic beliefs along multiple dimensions.  It was hypothesized 
that five relatively independent dimensions underlie studentsʼ epistemic beliefs.  These dimensions 
were (a) the structure of knowledge (collections of simple facts vs. a web of interrelated ideas), (b) 
the certainty of knowledge (answers are either right or wrong vs. assessment is relative to context), 
(c) speed of acquisition (i.e., knowledge is learnt quickly or not at all), (d) innate ability (fixed vs. 
malleable intelligence), and (e) authoritarian justification (i.e., knowledge is justified by a more 
knowledge authority figure).  While Schommerʼs (1990) original analysis confirmed only four of the 
                                                       
1 Epistemic beliefs will be understood to encompass all the beliefs an individual holds regarding knowledge, learning 
and justification. 
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five dimensions (authority was omitted), researchers have since found support for a five-
dimensional model (Bendixen, Schraw, & Dunkle, 1998; Jehng, Johnson, & Anderson, 1993). 
       Along with demonstrating multiple dimensions of epistemic beliefs, it was also demonstrated 
that students in different academic disciplines held different levels of beliefs (Jehng et al., 1993).  
However, this interpretation of epistemic beliefs has since been challenged.  It has alternatively 
been suggested that epistemic beliefs are discipline specific and not simply general beliefs about 
knowledge (Hofer, 2000; Buehl & Alexander, 2002; Schommer & Walker, 1995).  Consequentially, 
to avoid issues of cross-disciplinary interpretation, the survey used in this research was designed 
to measure five dimensions of epistemic beliefs solely in the discipline of mathematics. 
 
Survey Instruments & Epistemic Beliefs 
       While the use of survey instruments to measure epistemic beliefs may be a more efficient 
process to obtain data from larger groups of people quickly, it is necessary to demonstrate that the 
desired psychometric properties of the tools are present.  These, at a minimum, include validity of 
the measures, internal reliability among the items, and strong fit between the proposed 
multidimensional model of beliefs and obtained data.  To date, there have been issues with (at 
least) the last two items of this list. 
       One of the issues raised in their seminal review (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997) was the need to 
distinguish between epistemic beliefs that examine the nature of knowledge and knowing and those 
beliefs that examine the nature of instruction and learning (including beliefs about intelligence).  
This is partially addressed in the multidimensional model.  However, it is possible that an item may 
straddle these philosophical vs. educational distinctions.  Take for example:  “I will do well in this 
course if the instructor can explain things well.”  This item would generally be classified as an 
authoritarian belief item.  Yet, it suggests a learning element (doing well in the course) and a 
knowing element (justification provided by well explained examples).  Even within multidimensional 
models, most consisting of 3 to 5 dimensions, this issue has yet to be further explored. 
       Another issue associated with these survey tools is the choice of items used.  As is the case 
when attempting to measure a latent construct, a single item may be insufficient at directly 
obtaining a manifest response.  As such, collections of related items are provided with the hope 
that the underlying construct will emerge in a set of consistent and related responses.  As 
exploratory and confirmatory factory analysis (EFA & CFA) have been the statistical tools to assess 
the presence of multiple dimensions in these surveys, this strategy is appropriate.  However, some 
items have been conspicuous.  Reasons for this concern involve nebulous wording, multiple 
interpretations beyond the academic realm, or cross-discipline interpretations.  “Most things worth 
knowing are easy to understand,” is an example of a nebulously worded item.  The word choice 
“most” may cause students to interpret the item differently.  “Scientists can ultimately get to the 
truth,” is an example of an item that may be interpreted in a religious sense (truth) as opposed to 
an academic sense (factual).  “You can believe most things you read,” is an example of an item 
that may be interpreted differently across disciplines.  A student in a math class may provide a 
different response from a student in a history class.  As the use of such items is acceptable for a 
latent variable analysis, these issues may be unavoidable, but they still should be carefully 
considered. 
       In the process of determining which items are associated with which epistemic belief 
dimension, researchers have used EFA (Bendixen et al., 1998; Hofer, 2000; Jehng et al., 1993; 
Schommer, 1990) and CFA (DeBacker, Crowson, Beesley, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2008).  While it is 
ideal to propose a model delineating the number of dimensions with associated items and then test 
the fit between model and collected data using CFA, initial studies used an EFA approach to 
ascertain how many latent dimensions might be present.  As a result, research has been reported 
in support of a range between two and five dimensions (see DeBacker et al. [2008] for a summary 
review).  Additionally, EFA is better suited to explore the dimensional structure of uncorrelated or 
orthogonal latent variables.  As it is reasonable to expect multiple dimensions of epistemic beliefs 
to be correlated in some manner, the CFA strategy is more appropriate as the correlational 
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structure of multiple dimensions can be incorporated into the model.  In their exploratory study with 
multiple survey instruments (DeBacker et al., 2008), it was found that a five dimensional model may 
be appropriate, but there were issues with goodness-of-fit indices associated with the CFAs, and 
internal reliabilities among sets of items associated with specific dimensions were low.  As data has 
accumulated over the past two decades, there is adequate (if inconsistent) support of multiple 
dimensions.  At this stage, it would be appropriate to focus on CFA to determine the fit of a 
proposed model (specifying a fixed number of dimensions) with collected data. 
       Past research of multidimensional models has had a number of methodological issues.  The 
principal concern was the use of factor analysis applied to subsets of items (Schommer, 1990) as 
opposed to an analysis of the actual items.  The potential problem is that, in the aggregate, 
correlational affects may be exaggerated (an issue of great concern to factor analysis as the 
statistical analysis focuses on the variance-covariance relationships).  While researchers have 
since addressed this concern (see DeBacker et al. [2008] for a review), a subsequent issue has 
arisen regarding poor to weak measures of goodness-of-fit (a measure of how well the model fits 
the correlational structure of the collected data).  The standard for goodness-of-fit is a goodness-of-
fit index (GFI) above 0.9; the stronger gold standard is a GFI at or above 0.95 (Byrne, 2006).  As 
might be expected with smaller samples, these goodness-of-fit measures have not been achieved.  
In their large-sample study of three instruments (DeBacker et al., 2008), reasonable fit indices were 
obtained for one survey, but even then the measures were not consistently above 0.90.  The 
survey that produced consistent measures above 0.90 was an analysis conducted on subsets of 
items, thus the model did not assess the goodness-of-fit between the model and the individual 
survey items.  The dimensional structure will best be established when a CFA is tested on a model 
relating items to a predetermined number of dimensions and fit indices are consistently above 0.90. 
       Another concern with the current survey instruments is the relatively weak internal consistency 
measures among subsets of items related to specific dimensions.  For example, Bråten & 
Olaussen (2005) reported internal reliability coefficients between α = .46 and .67.  This is an issue 
that appears frequently in this body of research.  Some researchers report using the subsets of 
items with weaker reliability.  Other researchers acknowledge the dimensional structure, but only 
conduct additional analyses on those dimensions with adequate reliability measures.  While the 
use of the personal epistemology surveys is increasing, this is an issue that has yet to be resolved. 
 
Multitrait-Multimethod Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
       Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is the means by which a model of latent variables is 
proposed to predict the observed relationships between a set of measured variables.  From a 
measurement perspective, this model generally consists of a number of factors (the latent 
variables) that may or may not be correlated with each other.  In turn, these factors predict the 
measured variables up to an error term.  The vocabulary term of “factor” may not be ideal, as in the 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) conceptualization, a factor is a categorical variable of potential 
influence; the different categories comprising this variable are labelled levels.  Thus, in a two-way 
ANOVA, one factor may have three levels and another factor may have five.  In the CFA 
terminology, factor refers to each latent variable.  In a multidimensional model, this may not be an 
issue.  However, if there are two (or more) collections of dimensions that may influence the 
observed variables, the terminology becomes convoluted.  As such, to mirror the ANOVA 
formulation, the term factor will be used to describe the collection of dimensions, and the levels will 
be termed latent dimensions or latent categories. 
       The multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) CFA (Byrne, 2006) proposes two factors that may 
influence the observed variables.  From the multitrait perspective, there might be a number of latent 
traits; in the multimethod perspective, the observed variables may be measured by different 
methods.  It is not unreasonable to expect the observed variables to be effected by the trait of 
influence and the method of measurement.  This is comparable to a two-way ANOVA where the 
first factor is the trait and the second factor is the method of measurement.  The latent variables of 
the model would be the different traits (latent levels under the first factor) and different method 
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influences (latent levels under the second factor).  It is proposed that a second factor (comparable 
to a method effect) is present in the personal epistemology survey instruments currently in use. 
 
Proposal for a Second Factor in the Multidimensional Model 
       As noted earlier, when studying epistemic beliefs, it is necessary to distinguish between beliefs 
related to knowledge, knowing or justification and beliefs related to learning or teaching (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997, 2002).  Additionally, it is necessary to recognize that the wording of some items may 
arouse conceptions of knowledge different from that intended by the researcher.  For example, 
religious views (Lodewyk, 2007) may be instantiated when survey items refer to “truth.”  
Researchers have alluded to the possible distinctions between attributes of epistemic beliefs (Kuhn 
& Weinstock, 2002; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).  What follows is an attempt to distinguish the possible 
influence of subtle differences that appear in epistemic survey items. 
       To capture a quasi-method effect (an effect beyond that of the multiple dimensions), the 
following classification for items appearing in personal epistemology surveys is proposed. 
Philosophers—particularly epistemologists—study knowledge with the goal of axiomatically 
classifying beliefs as true, justified, etc.  One common example of an axiomatic definition of 
knowledge is the “true and justified belief” (BonJour, 2002).  While the nature of justification may 
suggest a process, the concern is more on the end result.  As such, I propose that items that 
suggest a formal or inferred definition of knowledge be classified as axiomatic.  Items suggesting 
the process of justification—which may be viewed as knowledge creation—alternatively should be 
classified as ontological (as ontology is the study of existence, this term suggests the process of 
how knowledge might come to exist).  Items that may be interpreted in a religious lens should be 
classified as deontological (the study of duty, morality and ethics).  Finally, items that refer to the 
application or use of knowledge should be termed procedural. 
       To illustrate, a few examples from common personal epistemology instruments are classified.  
The statement, “Absolute moral truth does not exist,” would be classified as deontological because 
it suggests morality and can be construed as a statement of religious or spiritual belief (from the 
Epistemic Beliefs Inventory [Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002]).  “How much a person gets out of 
school mostly depends on the quality of the teacher,” would be classified as ontological because it 
suggests how students become knowledgeable—how knowledge comes into existence for an 
individual student (from the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire [1998]).  “Itʼs a waste of time 
to work on problems that have no possibility of coming out with a clear-cut answer,” would be 
classified as procedural because it suggests a use of knowledge—the application of knowledge 
would not provide the desired result (Wood & Kardash, 2002).  Finally, from her discipline-specific 
survey (Hofer, 2000),  “Principles in this field are unchanging,” would be classified as axiomatic 
because it provides axiomatic information by which knowledge (the principles in the field) can be 
classified as knowledge (the unchanging nature). 
       Using this additional classification scheme, items in the survey used in this research will be 
classified accordingly and will be aligned with an epistemic dimension.  As such, the classification 
scheme will serve the role of a quasi-multimethod (the factor of classification with latent levels of 
axiomatic, ontologic, deontologic, and procedural).  Additionally, the multiple dimensions of 
epistemic beliefs will serve the role of the multitrait (the factor of dimension with latent levels of 
certainty, structure, authority, innate ability and speed of acquisition). 
       As suggested by Byrne (2006), when testing a MTMM CFA model, it is necessary to compare 
the more complicated model (with essentially two factors of multiple latent levels) with alternate 
models.  The standard models used to compare the MTMM model against are (a) a model with 
correlated error terms in place of the quasi-method effect, (b) a model with freely correlated 
dimensions but no quasi-method effect, (c) a model with perfectly correlated quasi-method effects 
and freely correlated dimensions, and (d) a model with freely correlated dimensions but 
uncorrelated quasi-method effects.  If the MTMM CFA model is found to statistically fit the data 
better, there is ample evidence to suggest the presence of a quasi-method effect (in this case, a 
classification effect amongst the items). 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
       To date, no personal epistemology surveys have been analysed using a MTMM CFA.  This is 
mainly due to the fact that even with surveys intended to measure multiple dimensions, it has not 
been hypothesized that an additional source of variation might be accounted for among the survey 
items.  This research attempts to explore whether an additional factor of latent levels, a quasi-
method effect associated with item classification, should be included in the survey analysis.  As 
such, the hypotheses to be explored in this project are: (1) The MTMM CFA analysis of a 
multidimensional personal epistemology survey that incorporates a quasi-method effect associated 
with item classification will produce high goodness-of-fit measures supporting the existence of five 
distinct (but potentially correlated) epistemic belief dimensions.  (2) The MTMM CFA will 
consistently produce higher goodness-of-fit measures compared to those observed to date using 
CFA on items (not subsets of items) aligned with multiple dimensions.  (3) The MTMM CFA will be 
the superior model regarding goodness-of-fit between model and data when compared to alternate 
models associated with the introduction of a potential quasi-method effect. 
 
Method 
Participants and Procedures 
       Data was collected from one community college district containing three schools located in a 
greater metropolitan area in the Pacific Northwest region of the USA.  Data was collected over two 
terms (Autumn 2008 and Winter 2009).  Participants were recruited from a variety of mathematics 
classes ranging from Pre-Algebra to Introduction to Differential Equations.  For the first term, there 
were 381 respondents to the pre-survey and 351 respondents to the post-survey with 276 
responding to both surveys (unique n = 456).  For the second term, there were 359 respondents to 
the pre-survey and 333 respondents to the post-survey with 249 responding to both surveys 
(unique n = 443). 
     Across the two terms, the mean age was M = 24.1 years (SD = 6.7), with ages ranging from 16 
to 61, and 84.8% of the students were 18 to 29 years old2.  The sample consisted of 48.7% male 
respondents and 51.1% female respondents; a total of 41 students did not report a gender, and 2 
participants were trans-identifying individuals.  In the two terms, 1291 students indicated race in a 
clearly discernable manner (9.1% of the participants did not provide information on race or 
ethnicity).  Of the self-identified group of respondents, 46.9% where white, 36.9% were Asian, 7.2% 
were black, 3.4% were Latin@, 2.2% were Arab, 1.2% were Native American, and 2.2% indicated 
mixed race.  These proportions of represented ethnicities and races were not disproportionate from 
the district as a whole (47% students of colour). 
       All students participating were invited to take the survey twice each term, once near the start of 
the term and once near the end.  Surveys were completed online, and in most cases, students 
received a minimal amount of course credit for participating.  Additionally, participation was 




       Participants completed an online survey intended to measure motivation, epistemic beliefs, 
affect and demographic information.  All items, as appropriate, were written in a manner 
appropriate to the discipline of mathematics.  While the data collection was part of a larger study, 
only the epistemic beliefs are examined here.  The portion of the survey measuring epistemic 
beliefs consisted of 25 items that were chosen—and revised as necessary—from a large collection 
                                                       
2 Four students reported ages under 18; these students were excluded because parental consent was not obtained. 
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of previously published survey items (Schraw et al., 2002; Schommer, 1998; Wood & Kardash, 
2002; Hofer, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 2002). 
 
       Epistemic dimensions. 
       In line with the original multidimensional framework proposed by Schommer (1990), items were 
chosen to measure five distinct dimensions of epistemic beliefs.  Students were asked to indicate 
their level of agreement with a list of statements using a Likert scale (strongly disagree, disagree, 
neutral, agree, strongly agree).  For each dimension, five items were chosen for their lack of 
ambiguity and consistent association with the proposed dimension in earlier research.  Items were 
coded so that a higher score (agree and strongly agree) would indicate a less sophisticated 
epistemic belief.  The certainty dimension measures beliefs about answers being right or wrong 
compared with the belief that the accuracy of an answer may be more context-dependent.  An 
example for this dimension is, “The best thing about math courses is that most problems have only 
one right answer.”  The simple dimension measures beliefs that knowledge is a collection of simple 
and distinct facts compared with the belief that knowledge is an interconnected web of ideas.  An 
example for this dimension is, “I try my best to combine information from math class with 
knowledge I have about other topics” (this item was reverse coded).  The authority dimension 
measures beliefs that knowledge is given and confirmed by an omniscient authority compared with 
a belief that knowledge is justified by appropriate arguments of the knower.  An example for this 
dimension is, “How much math a student learns mostly depends on the quality of the teacher.”  The 
innate ability dimension measures beliefs that intelligence is an attribute fixed at birth compared 
with the more malleable belief that individuals can learn how to learn.  An example from this 
dimension is, “How well you do in math class depends on how smart you are.”  The final dimension 
is the speed of acquisition; this dimension measures beliefs that learning occurs quickly or not at all 
compared with beliefs that some learning requires diligent persistence.  An example from this 
dimension is, “If a person spends too much time trying to understand a problem, they will most 
likely just end up being confused.”  The complete list of 25 items of the survey (5 items grouped 
into 5 dimensions each) can be seen in the Appendix. 
 
       Philosophical classification. 
       Items selected for the five epistemic belief dimensions were next classified as axiomatic, 
ontologic, deontologic or procedural.  Items that were ambiguous (e.g., “A course in study skills 
would probably be valuable”) were not classified and were omitted from the survey.  Additionally, as 
the possible religious or moral concept was perceived as potentially ambiguous for some 
participants, no deontological items were included.  At most, two classifications were used within 
each dimension.  An example of an item classified as axiomatic is, “What is true in mathematics 
today will be true in mathematics tomorrow,” as this concept of “truth” provides an axiomatic 
definition for knowledge in the discipline of mathematics.  An example of an item classified as 
ontologic is, “The more mathematics you know, the more there is to learn,” as this suggests the 
process of learning (knowledge creation).  Finally, a procedural item that suggests how knowledge 
is used as opposed to created or defined is, “When someone who knows more math than I do tells 
me what to do, I usually do it.”  Of the final list of 25 items, 3 were classified as axiomatic, 16 as 
ontologic and 6 as procedural.  The complete list of classifications can be seen in the Appendix. 
 
Results 
       From the pre- and post-surveys from both academic terms, there were 1420 subjects who 
provided information on the 25 personal epistemology items (with a missing response rate of 
0.4%).  As is discussed below, 6 of these items were not used in the composite scales, and the 
remaining information refers to the subset of 19 items used.  Data was retained for participants that 
answered all 19 items, leaving a final sample size of n = 1345. 
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       The data collection process imposed two important constraints that were subsequently 
addressed in the statistical analyses.  Data was collected from some individuals at more than one 
time (pre- and post-survey in two terms).  This means that multiple responses were obtained from 
the same individual.  Additionally, it is possible that time of collection influenced student responses.  
To address the first concern, a data set of randomly chosen single appearances was tested.  
Comparable results were obtained to those from the analysis of the complete data set.  This 
suggests that the five-factor MTMM solution is invariant across test-retesting situations, thus 
supporting test-retest reliability of the survey instrument.  As such, results for the complete data set 
are presented.  The possible effect of time of data collection was also examined by comparing 
models across time groupings (pre-post testing and the two academic terms).  The final model 
demonstrated relative invariance across time (term:  CFI = 0.937 & RMSEA = .024; pre-post:  
CFI = 0.938 & RMSEA = .024). 
       Prior to assessing the MTMM CFA, the survey items were examined to determine if some 
items should be omitted from the analysis.  This was done by examining a random split-half of the 
data set.  Items were removed from the model, and correlations between latent variables were 
introduced into the model.  The resultant model was then confirmed on the remaining half of the 
data set.  Results strongly indicated agreement between the two analyses, and the remaining 
analyses were conducted on the entire data set.  It is necessary to note that this EFA differs from 
previous processes as it was not used to determine the number of factors (this was always 
assumed to be five, as the theory suggests), and this was not used to determine which items 
loaded onto which factors (this was assumed prior to the model).  The purpose of the EFA was 
solely to remove items.  The intention was to obtain dimensions that might have higher internal 
reliabilities when examined separately (a desired psychometric property allowing cross-sample 
analysis and comparisons). 
       The method used to assess possible adjustments to the model followed these criteria.  Ideally, 
at most one—but no more than two—items per dimension would be dropped.  An item would be 
dropped if exceptionally weak loadings were observed on both latent variables associated with that 
item.  Additionally, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test was used to determine if the model fit would 
increase if a constraint were to be freely estimated.  (The main purpose for this was to locate 
correlations between latent variables, but an item could be dropped if the model suggested strong 
loading on a latent variable other than that suggested by theory.)  Correlations between the latent 
variables (traits and quasi-methods) were not forbidden by the multidimensional epistemic belief 
model.  Thus, inclusion of these parameters in the model seemed acceptable. 
       In the end, 19 items were retained.  Each dimension retained 4 items except the structure 
dimension; this dimension retained three items (factor loadings and communalities presented in 
Table 1).  Additionally, the final model had no error correlations and included the following latent 
variable correlations:  authority-ontologic, certainty-ontologic, structure-axiomatic, and structure-
ontologic.  The overall fit of the model was strong:  χ²(116) = 342.35, p < .001; NFI = 0.909; 
CFI = 0.937; GFI = 0.974; AGFI = 0.958; SRMR = .031; RMSEA = .038, 90% C.I. (.033, .043).  As 
a concern regarding lack of normality was indicated in some of the item responses, a robust 
maximum likelihood analysis was run.  Results were comparable (and stronger), suggesting the 
lack of normality was not an issue for concern. 
       The reliability coefficient was ρ = .725 for this model.  This value would indicate a moderate—
but psychometrically acceptable—internal consistency.  While it was hoped that removing items 
might increase the internal reliability of the subscales, the Cronbachʼs α values for the subscales 
were all α = .595 or lower.  See Table 2 for summary statistics for each epistemic belief dimension. 
       Next, it was necessary to confirm that the MTMM structure is the appropriate model for this 
data.  As is customary, 3 pairs of models were examined in comparison to the MTMM model.  The 
first pair examines the model where one set of traits is missing, and the remaining set of traits is 
free to correlate (no traits with correlated methods and correlated traits with no methods; models 2a 
and 2b, respectively).  These models would be comparable to one-factor of influence, as opposed 
to two-factors of influence.  The second pair examines the models where one set of traits is 
perfectly correlated, and the remaining set of traits is free to correlate (perfectly correlated traits 
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with freely correlated methods and freely correlated traits with perfectly correlated methods; models 
3a and 3b, respectively).  These models assume the influence of a method effect, but as a single 
global influence, as opposed to a differentiated form of influence.  The final pair examines the 
model where one set of traits is freely correlated, and the remaining set of traits is strictly 
uncorrelated (freely correlated traits with uncorrelated methods and uncorrelated traits with freely 
correlated methods; models 4a and 4b, respectively).  It is customary to only analyse one of each 
pair in an MTMM analysis.  However, since the second dimension is not truly conceptualized as a 
“method,” it is more appropriate to treat both dimensions as quasi-traits, and thus it is prudent to 
run all pairs of analyses.  Results are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Discussion 
       The principal hypothesis for this research project was that the MTMM CFA analysis of a 
multidimensional personal epistemology survey incorporating a quasi-method effect associated 
with item classification would support the existence of five distinct epistemic belief dimensions.  
The NFI and CFI are both above 0.90 but below 0.95, thus suggesting adequate—if not excellent—
fit between the model and the data.  Alternatively, the GFI and AGFI are both above 0.95 
suggesting superior fit between the model and the data.  Further evidence for superior fit is an 
SRMR less than .05 along with the bound on the 90% confidence interval for the RMSEA that was 
below .05.  As the goodness-of-fit measures were strong to excellent, this hypothesis appears to be 
confirmed.  Furthermore, while this research project did not attempt to address the content validity 
of the survey, it is noted that these items have consistently been associated with comparable 
epistemic belief dimensions in other analyses (DeBacker et al., 2008; Schraw et al., 2002; 
Schommer, 1998; Wood & Kardash, 2002; Hofer, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 2002). 
       The five epistemic belief dimensions were found to be distinct traits.  However, it was also 
observed that there was a correlation between these beliefs.  As the dimensions all relate to a 
personʼs belief in knowledge or learning, this correlation would not be unexpected.  The 
correlations were not strong, ranging from r = .20 to .43, but they were significant.  The strongest 
correlations appeared between the dimensions of innate ability and quick learning and between 
innate ability and authority.  As these dimensions were more related to instruction and learning as 
opposed to knowledge and knowing, this is a reasonable finding. 
       Another subtle element of the findings provides support for the quasi-method effect.  The factor 
loadings for the epistemic belief dimensions, with reverse coding as appropriate, all have positive 
signs.  This would be expected as the epistemic belief would be expected to influence each 
manifest item in a unidirectional manner.  However, it is noted that the quasi-method effect was 
positive in all items except those items that were reverse coded.  This suggests an influence 
related to the actual item (the method) as opposed to the content of the item (the relation to the 
latent trait being measured). 
       The second hypothesis was that the goodness-of-fit measures would be consistently higher 
than those observed to date using CFA on items aligned with multiple dimensions.  While it is not 
possible to statistically test such a claim, it is noted that to date, this is the only analysis conducted 
that has produced fit statistics in the strong to excellent range for all standard measures.  Thus, this 
provides support for the existence of the five epistemic belief dimensions, and it provides 
compelling evidence for the need to consider other influential elements of the survey items in future 
studies. 
       While space limitations prohibit a more detailed analysis of the alternate models that should be 
considered when testing a MTMM CFA model, it is important to note that one model was excluded:  
the correlated uniqueness model.  This model assumes that multiple dimensions exist, but the 
method effect is modelled by correlations among the error terms, as opposed to a new set of latent 
variables.  An attempt was made to test this model, but convergence issues prevented doing so.  
The strongest support for the existence of the quasi-method effect was the comparison of the 
MTMM CFA model to the single-factor models (the first pair of alternate models).  The models 
proposing one-factor of influence demonstrated much poorer fit indices and the MTMM model was 
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statistically significantly superior.  It was noted that the only alternate model that suggested 
adequate fit was a multidimensional model with a perfectly correlated quasi-method effect (model 
3b:  one general method effect as opposed to distinct method effects).  However, a chi-square test 
supports the claim that the MTMM model is the better fit (Δχ²(4) = 28.0, p < 0.001).  In total, these 
analyses provide strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that the MTMM CFA model is the 
superior model regarding fit to the observed data. 
       As noted, the reliability coefficient (ρ = .725) would indicate a moderate—but psychometrically 
acceptable—internal consistency.  Yet, this consistency depends on the MTMM analysis, and this 
internal consistency may not be present with simple aggregate measures for each subscale or 
dimension of the epistemic beliefs (e.g., creating a scale by averaging the item responses in each 
dimension).  While it was hoped that removing items might increase the internal reliability of the 
subscales, the Cronbachʼs α values for the subscales were exceptionally low (all below α = .595). 
 
Future Research 
       One unforeseen artefact of the choice of items was the collusion effect of the axiomatic 
classification with the certainty belief dimension.  The classifications for procedural and ontologic 
cross at least two epistemic belief dimensions.  However, as the axiomatic classification appears 
only in the certainty belief dimension, there is some concern that the weak factor loadings on this 
epistemic belief dimension may be confounded.  As this is not a standard factor analysis, the 
introduction of the MTMM model can account for slightly smaller factor loadings than traditionally 
accepted.  However, this should be explored with future research that includes items classified as 
axiomatic across more than one epistemic belief dimension. 
       Regarding additional items, it is recommended that future research be conducted with larger 
sets of items in the hope that improved internal reliabilities can be obtained for aggregate 
subscales for each epistemic belief dimension.  Aggregate subscales are more desirable than the 
latent factor scores because this will permit comparison of epistemic beliefs across samples.  
Additionally, with the introduction of more items, it would be possible to consider introducing items 
classified as deontologic. 
       In conclusion, it has been hypothesized that five distinct epistemic belief dimensions influence 
peopleʼs responses to personal epistemology surveys.  Yet, this had yet to be strongly confirmed 
with CFA.  This research demonstrated a very strong fit between a model proposing five 
dimensions of epistemic belief and observed data.  With the use of the MTMM CFA model, it is 
possible to examine the relationship of all five distinct dimensions of epistemic beliefs with other 
academic variables, including motivation (Ricco, Pierce & Medinilla, 2010), academic performance 
(Lodewyk, 2007), and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997).  The current findings indicate that concerns 
with sample-specific analyses will need to be examined in future research.  Refinements to the 
survey used here and alternate analysis of other surveys currently being used in the literature 
should strengthen the psychometric reliability of the instruments and provide rich avenues of 
exploration of areas of research in educational psychology. 
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Epistemic belief survey items grouped by dimension and classification. 
 
  A O P 
Certainty    
 If two students are arguing about a math problem, at least one of them 
must be wrong.    
 What is true in mathematics today will be true in mathematics tomorrow.    
 The best thing about math courses is that most problems have only one 
right answer.    
 If mathematicians try hard enough, they can find the answer to almost 
every problem.    
 The most important aspect of mathematical work is precision and careful 
work.    
Structure    
 I try my best to combine information from math class with knowledge I 
have about other topics.    
 The more mathematics you know, the more there is to learn.    
 Being a good math student generally involves memorizing procedures and 
formulas.    
 Itʼs a waste of time to work on math problems that have no possibility of 
coming out with a clear-cut answer.    
 Mathematical information should be presented in a straightforward fashion; 
students should not have to read between the lines.    
Authority    
 Sometimes you just have to accept answers from a math instructor even 
though you donʼt understand them.    
 How much math a student learns mostly depends on the quality of the 
teacher.    
 When someone who knows more math than I do tells me what to do, I 
usually do it.    
 The most important part of being a good math student is original thinking.    
 When you first encounter a difficult concept in a math textbook, itʼs best to 
work it out on your own.    
Innate Ability    
 Really smart students donʼt have to work hard to do well in math classes.    
 How well you do in math class depends on how smart you are.    
 Peopleʼs mathematical abilities are fixed at birth.    
 Genius is 10% ability and 90% hard work.    
 Working hard on a difficult problem for an extended period of time only 
pays off for really smart students.    
Quick-Learning    
 Successful math students understand things quickly.    
 Working on a math problem with no quick solution is a waste of time.    
 Working on a difficult math problem for an extended period only pays off 
for really smart students.    
 If a person canʼt solve a math problem in a short amount of time, they 
should keep on trying.    
 If a person spends too much time trying to understand a problem, they will 
most likely just end up being confused.    
A: axiomatic; O: ontologic; P: procedural 
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Table 1.  Epistemic belief subscales (with MTMM) and factor loadings 
 
C I A S Q O P Ax Subscales & items R2 
        Certainty  
.438       .360    The most important aspect of mathematical work is precision and careful work. .17 
.193       .441  What is true in mathematics today will be true in mathematics tomorrow. .23 
.340       .491    If mathematicians try hard enough, they can find the answer to almost every problem. .20 
.086       .454  The best thing about math courses is that most problems have only one right answer. .21 
        Innate Ability  
 .561      .339    Really smart students donʼt have to work hard to do well in math classes. .43 
 .421      .454    Peopleʼs mathematical abilities are fixed at birth. .38 
 .553    –.233   
 Genius is 10% ability and 90% hard work. .36 
 .359      .438    How well you do in math class depends on how smart you are. .32 
        Authority  
  .363     .432   
 Sometimes you just have to accept answers from a 
math instructor even though you donʼt understand 
them. 
.18 
  .352    –.130  
 When you first encounter a difficult concept in a math 
textbook, itʼs best to work it out on your own. .14 
  .469    –.299  
 The most important part of being a good math student 
is original thinking. .31 
  .362      .478   When someone who knows more math than I do tells me what to do, I usually do it. .36 
        Structure  
   .579     .315  
 Itʼs a waste of time to work on math problems that 
have no possibility of coming out with a clear-cut 
answer. 
.43 
   .381  –.221   
 I try my best to combine information from math class 
with knowledge I have about other topics. .16 
   .521  –.299   
 The more mathematics you know, the more there is to 
learn. .30 
        Quick-Learning  
    .421   .462    Working on a difficult math problem for an extended period only pays off for really smart students. .39 
    .664   .399    Working on a math problem with no quick solution is a waste of time. .60 
    .388   .225   
 If a person spends too much time trying to understand 
a problem, they will most likely just end up being 
confused. 
.20 
    .414 –.080   
 If a person canʼt solve a math problem in a short 
amount of time, they should keep on trying. .18 
C: Certainty; I: Innate Ability; A: Authority; S: Structure; Q: Quick-Learning; Ax: axiomatic; O: ontologic; P: 
procedural.  Reverse coded items indicated with a ().  The single factor loading not significant at the α = .05 
level indicated in bold.  n = 1345. 
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Table 2.  Epistemic belief subscales:  Summary statistics, reliabilities and correlations 
 
M (SD) α    Certain Innate Authority Structure Quick 
7.4 (2.1) 0.463  Certain     0.196   0.209   0.220   0.177 
2.6 (1.4) 0.576  Innate      0.432   0.217   0.398 
5.0 (1.5) 0.595  Authority       0.244   0.243 
2.5 (1.4) 0.242  Structure        0.242 
2.4 (1.3) 0.400  Quick       
Correlations predicted by the MTMM CFA model.  n = 1345. 
 
 
Table 3.  Summary of goodness-of-fit for related MTMM models for epistemic beliefs 
 
Model χ² d.f. SRMR CFI RMSEA 90% C.I. 
1 freely correlated beliefs 
freely correlated classifications 342.35 116 0.031 0.937 0.038 (0.033,0.043) 
2a no beliefs 
freely correlated classifications 1472.0 149 0.081 0.633 0.081 (0.077,0.085) 
2b freely correlated beliefs 
no classifications 1099.7 142 0.074 0.734 0.071 (0.067,0.075) 
3a perfectly correlated beliefs 
freely correlated classifications 594.59 126 0.039 0.870 0.053 (0.048,0.057) 
3b freely correlated beliefs 
perfectly correlated classifications 370.31 120 0.032 0.931 0.039 (0.035,0.044) 
4a freely correlated beliefs 
uncorrelated classifications 615.03 122 0.058 0.863 0.055 (0.051,0.059) 
4b uncorrelated beliefs 
freely correlated classifications 838.62 127 0.069 0.803 0.065 (0.060,0.069) 
Model 3b respecified with a latent factor correlation set to zero (structure and axiomatic).  Model 4a 
respecified with an equality constraint imposed between a certainty item (E5) and a quick-learning item 
(E22), between an innate ability item (E9) and the same quick learning item (E22), and with a latent factor 
correlation set to zero (authority and ontologic).  Model 4b respecified with an equality constraint imposed 
between an authority item (E15) and a quick learning item (E22). 
 
 
